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Abstract: Despite the large-scale investments of both China and the EU 
in climate-change mitigation and renewable-energy promotion, the pre-
vailing view on China–EU relations is one of conflict rather than cooper-
ation. In order to evaluate the prospects of cooperation between China 
and the EU in these policy fields, empirical research has to go beyond 
simplistic narratives. This paper suggests a conceptual apparatus that will 
help researchers better understand the complexities of the real world. 
The relevant actors operate at different levels and in the public and pri-
vate sectors. The main message of the paper is that combining the multi-
level governance and value-chain approaches helps clarify the multiple 
relationships between these actors. 
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Introduction  
The prevailing view on China and the European Union (EU) in the fields 
of climate-change mitigation and renewable-energies promotion is one of 
conflictive rather than cooperative relations. Recent rows between the 
Chinese government and the European Commission over the support of 
renewable-energy industries (Kanter 2012) demonstrate the fact that 
climate and renewable-energy policies are also viewed through the lens 
of industrial policy rather than just environmental policy. Both the EU 
and China are making significant investments in renewable energies – 
not only to mitigate climate change but also to increase energy security 
and to promote national renewable-energy industries. While the policy 
goals of mitigating climate change and increasing energy security are 
leading to an alignment of interests among public and private actors at 
the national levels in China and the EU, enhancing the competitiveness 
of national renewable-energy industries could lead to conflicts at the 
international level.   
Our main argument in this article1 is that in order to evaluate the 
prospects of cooperation (as well as conflict) between China and the EU 
in the fields of climate-change mitigation and renewable-energy promo-
tion, empirical research has to go beyond simplistic pictures. In order to 
investigate the complexities of the relationships between China and the 
EU, this article presents a conceptual apparatus that helps to identify 
where we can expect cooperation, conflict or competition. The relevant 
actors in the field of climate policy and renewable energy operate at dif-
ferent levels and in the public and private sectors. Combining the multi-
level governance (MLG) approach and the global value-chain (GVC) 
approaches can help us better understand those interactions.  
The paper is structured as follows: The next section explains why 
understanding relations between Europe and China is so important for 
the “low carbon” debate. We will then introduce the GVC and the MLG 
approaches and explain why a combination of them is especially promis-
ing from a conceptual point of view. The following section highlights 
1 The authors would like to thank the German Ministry for Research and Education, 
the British Academy, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences for generously 
supporting the work on this paper through the European ERA-NET “Co-Reach” 
project entitled “The Impact of Emerging Power: China–EU Cooperation and 
Global Governance”. Furthermore, we would like to thank Matthew Lockwood, 
Dirk Messner, the anonymous reviewers, and the editorial team of the Journal of 
Current Chinese Affairs for their helpful comments. 
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how this conceptual framework might be used to analyse governance 
processes in the climate and renewable-energy sectors in China and the 
EU.  
Europe, China and Low-Carbon Development 
In the face of the global challenge to mitigate climate change, transition-
ing to low-carbon development is imperative. Without reducing green-
house gas emissions, the world is likely to experience “dangerous” cli-
mate change that can potentially lead to large-scale disruptions of natu-
ral, economic and social systems (Lenton et al. 2008). This threat is being 
taken seriously in the EU and in China. Both the EU and China are 
committed to substantially reducing emissions, though China has so far 
rejected binding international targets. Both China and the EU are key 
players in the development and deployment of renewable energies such 
as wind and solar photovoltaic (PV) power.  
The concept of low-carbon development has been widely adopted 
due to the recognition that new, climate-friendly development pathways 
are needed worldwide. Low-carbon development means using less car-
bon for economic growth by, for example, using less energy, switching 
from fossil fuels to low-carbon energy, and promoting natural carbon 
sinks (DFID 2009). In addition to ambitious and binding emission-
reduction targets, renewable-energy technologies play a key role in 
achieving low-carbon development. The potential of the exploration of 
renewable-energy resources is enormous: Solar energy has an estimated 
potential of 370 Petawatt hours per year (PWh/year); primary biomass 
has an estimated potential of 315 PWh/year; wind energy has an esti-
mated potential of 96 PWh/year; and hydropower has an estimated po-
tential of 41 PWh/year (WEC 2007). Renewable-energy technology, 
particularly solar PV and wind, has seen a dramatic increase in terms of 
the power capacity that has been installed in recent years, particularly in 
the EU and China (see Figures 1 and 2). 
What China does in terms of climate-change mitigation and low-car-
bon development matters for the rest of the world. China’s heavy reli-
ance on coal and the country’s rapid economic growth – which to a large 
extent is a result of over-investment in heavy industries (Rosen and 
Houser 2007) – has propelled it into the position of the world’s biggest 
polluter in absolute terms, accounting for more than 22 per cent of glob-
al emissions in 2007 (IEA 2011). The proportion of China’s energy sup-
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ply provided by coal in 2009 was 67 per cent; the corresponding figure 
vis-à-vis the country’s electricity supply for that year was 79 per cent 
(IEA 2012). Nevertheless, despite being the world’s largest emitter, Chi-
na still has low per capita and historic emissions compared with devel-
oped countries. It also has to be noted that approximately 23 per cent of 
Chinese emissions are due to China’s industrial exports, which result to a 
large extent from the EU and the US outsourcing production to China 
(Watson and Wang 2007). 
Figure 1: Global Cumulative Installed Solar PV Capacity, 2000–2010 (in MW) 
Source: Authors’ compilation with data based on EPIA 2011. 
Whether China’s emissions are going to increase or decrease in the fu-
ture will have a significant impact on global climate change. Although 
worries about climate change have not been a driving force of China’s 
energy policies until very recently (Richerzhagen and Scholz 2008; 
Hallding, Han, and Olsson 2009), concerns over energy efficiency and 
the environmental impacts of energy production have resulted in increas-
ingly ambitious targets for the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions. As 
part of the autonomous domestic action under the Copenhagen Climate 
Accord of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), China promised to reduce emissions per unit of 
GDP by 40 to 45 per cent by 2020 compared to the 2005 level and to 
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increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to 
approximately 15 per cent by 2020. Shortly after announcing the auton-
omous action, the latter policy goal was revised upwards to a share of 20 
per cent of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption by 2020. 
However, in contrast to the EU, China is hesitant to commit to binding 
international commitments that would interfere with its national sover-
eignty (Lewis 2010). 
Figure 2: Global Cumulative Installed Wind Capacity, 2000–2010 (in MW) 
Source: Authors’ compilation with data based on Brown 2011 and GWEC 2011.  
Though China is known as the world’s largest polluter, it is also known 
as the world’s champion of the production of low-carbon technologies. 
The Chinese government today identifies renewable energies and renew-
able-energy technologies as important building blocks for China’s future 
economic development (12th Five-Year Plan 2011). China is already the 
world’s largest producer of wind turbines and solar panels and it is often 
suggested that China has the potential to become a provider of afford-
able renewable-energy technology worldwide. Chinese companies have 
started moving into African renewable-energy markets, and in 2010 
Prime Minister Wen Jiabao announced the construction of 100 Chinese 
renewable-energy projects in Africa covering solar power, biogas and 
hydropower facilities (Conrad, Fernandez, and Houshyani 2011). As 
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shown by Lema, Berger and Schmitz (article is part of this issue of 
JCCA), China’s entry into the wind energy industry is reshaping the rela-
tionships between the key players in the global market in a major way. As 
seen in Figure 2, China is increasing its market power in the wind energy 
industry. This has been closely accompanied and followed by producer 
power, which has put incumbents under pressure and driven down costs 
in external markets. China has also caused major disruption and driven 
down costs in the solar panel industry, but the dynamics are different 
(Fischer 2012): Here, Chinese firms have managed to build up producer 
power and take large market shares in Europe without using solar energy 
as a key means to reduce greenhouse gas emissions domestically (see 
Figure 1). 
Similar to China, the EU and its 27 member countries are major 
emitters of greenhouse gases (GHG). After China and the US, the EU as 
an entity is the world’s third-largest emitter. Similar to China, most of the 
economies within the EU member states are heavily dependent on fossil 
fuels, mainly on oil and natural gas (IEA 2011). At the same time, and in 
contrast to China, the EU is an active player in global climate govern-
ance. The EU and its individual member states – except for Malta and 
Cyprus – have signed the UNFCCC as Annex 1 countries, thus agreeing 
to cut emissions and promote technology transfer to less-developed 
countries (Lema and Lema 2012). Under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU 
aims to reduce its GHG emissions by 8 per cent compared to 1990 lev-
els. As a follow up to the Copenhagen Accord, the EU pledged to reduce 
its GHG emissions by 20 per cent by 2020, and by 30 per cent as long as 
other main actors reduce their GHG emissions to the same degree com-
pared to 1990 levels (UNFCCC 2010). In 2007 the EU set binding tar-
gets to reduce emissions by 20 per cent and to increase the share of re-
newable energies to 20 per cent by 2020. The 2007 European Strategy 
Energy Technology Plan (SET Plan) advocates for the EU to become 
carbon neutral by 2050 to tackle climate change, increase energy security, 
and increase industrial competitiveness based on the promotion of low-
carbon energy technologies (EC 2007). 
European countries have also been early movers in the field of re-
newable energies. Some of them have been investing in renewable-en-
ergy technology for decades and are technological leaders in the devel-
opment and deployment of renewable energy. The EU uses the most 
renewable energy in the world, followed by China (IEA 2011). Wind and 
solar PV power are particularly important within the EU; key leading 
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countries in wind power are Germany, Spain and Denmark (EWEA 
2010). The EU is also a global leader in solar energy – 75 per cent of the 
world’s installed solar PV capacity can be found in the EU, mainly in 
Germany, Spain and Italy (REN21 2010).  
Even though at first sight there are similarities between China’s and 
the EU’s goals to reduce the carbon intensity of economic growth, the 
original rationales of the two entities for investing in low-carbon energy 
were different. While the initial push in the 1980s and 1990s in European 
countries can be explained by a growing ecological consciousness, Chi-
na’s turn to green technologies was mainly a function of economic and 
energy security interests, and to a lesser extent a result of environmental 
and climate considerations (Lim 2010; Heggelund 2007). This may be 
explained by China’s lower level of development as well as the need of 
the Chinese government to legitimise itself through high rates of eco-
nomic growth. However, in the course of the global financial and eco-
nomic crisis of 2008/ 2009, the EU also identified investing in renew-
able-energy development as a way to overcome the crisis, create jobs and 
develop new growth perspectives. China is also increasingly considering 
the environmental impacts of its growth strategies. 
While the positions of China and the EU are converging on envi-
ronmental issues, we need to recognise that political processes and policy 
instruments are different. While the EU relies mainly on market mecha-
nisms to reduce emissions and foster renewable energies, China, more 
often than not, applies command and control instruments. This may be 
partly explained by the predominance of state-owned companies in the 
Chinese economy in contrast to the mixture of private and state-owned 
companies in the EU. China and the EU furthermore differ with respect 
to the level of centralisation of decision-making processes, at least for-
mally, and the role of civil society organisations in policy-making pro-
cesses. At the same time, China’s decision-making process is different 
from the EU’s decision-making process, which is exemplified by China’s 
Five-Year Plans. These and other differences make it hard to judge the 
nature of interaction at the international level. The purpose of this article 
is to suggest a way of dealing with these complexities. Our central prop-
osition is that the MLG and GVC frameworks help to do this. Applying 
these two approaches shows that the formula that states that “coopera-
tion results from climate-change mitigation efforts, and conflict results 
from the economic potential of the renewable-energy sectors” is mis-
leading and fails to capture the many different layers of China–EU rela-
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tions in these areas. These approaches help to delineate the issues and 
then recompose them in order to draw conclusions.   
The Analytical Challenge: Grasping Complexity 
This section provides the conceptual framework for an empirical investi-
gation of China–EU relations in the allocation of emission-reduction 
targets and in the wind and solar PV sectors. The task of specifying 
where cooperation, competition and conflict are most likely is difficult 
because the relevant actors are embedded in different economic and 
political systems. We need to unpack these systems. Dealing with this 
challenge requires a conceptual framework that recognises that the rele-
vant actors operate at different levels of governance and focuses on ac-
tors from both the private and public sectors.  
With respect to the first requirement, private and public sector dy-
namics are insufficiently explained by developments on one level of gov-
ernance alone. Essentially, politics in China and Europe are a function of 
decisions taken on various levels. While this argument is well established 
in the literature on policy-making within the EU, we argue that it is 
equally important to approach policy-making in China from an MLG 
perspective. In addition, private sector dynamics, too, are influenced by 
decisions taken by actors operating on various levels of value chains.  
With respect to the second requirement, shifts of productive and 
innovative capabilities in the wind and solar PV industries are not suffi-
ciently explained by dynamics within the private sector alone. Instead, 
government-induced demand has been – and still is – important for the 
development of renewable energies due to high up-front investments 
and the difference in price compared to electricity produced from fossil 
fuels (Lewis and Wiser 2007). Furthermore, in contrast to other sectors, 
governments are supporting renewable energies not only due to econom-
ic interests (for instance, employment generation and competitiveness of 
national companies) but also due to domestic public interests (for exam-
ple, energy security), and eventually global public interests (for example, 
climate-change mitigation).  
In the subsequent two sections, we will explain that the MLG and 
GVC approaches together comply with these requirements and are 
therefore well suited for use in analysing the complexities of the nexus 
between the climate and renewable energy in China and the EU.  
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Multi-level Governance Approach 
The MLG concept was developed as an analytical tool to understand the 
development of complex political systems in post-World War II Western 
Europe – in particular, the formation of the European Union (Piattoni 
2010). Based on this differentiation of policy-making, in the EU the term 
MLG encompasses three analytical dimensions of governance: decision-
making that 1) takes place on multiple levels, 2) involves multiple public 
and private actors, and 3) uses various forms of governance (Bache and 
Flinders 2004). These three dimensions will be elaborated in the subse-
quent paragraphs.  
The first dimension stresses political processes and structures that 
connect institutions on a transnational, national and subnational level. 
These processes and structures cut across the boundaries of specific 
political constituencies or organisations in order to address and manage 
interdependencies in political decision-making (Benz 2005). MLG ad-
dresses issues that cannot be sufficiently dealt with at a single level of 
governance. Such multi-level systems result from a division of power and 
resources among separate territorial or functional organisations. The 
division of power and competencies may be formal or factual. The cru-
cial criterion for constituting an MLG system is that it coordinates vari-
ous actors on different levels of governance. Actors on different govern-
ance levels interact with one another because their tasks are interrelated. 
The second dimension of MLG emphasises the multitude of actors 
in governance processes. First, various actors are involved in the process 
of coordination between governmental bodies with sometimes overlap-
ping responsibilities (Hooghe and Marks 2011). Second, governments at 
whatever level may not be homogenous actors. Different ministries, 
different political decision-makers, different decision-making bodies, 
different representatives, etc., may pursue different interests and strate-
gies even if they are formally located at one level of governance. Third, 
private actors (actors not belonging to formal government bodies) may 
play an important role in the coordination processes that constitute gov-
ernance (Pattberg 2004).  
The third dimension of MLG refers to the fact that policies are not 
solely the result of hierarchical and formally structured decision-making 
and implementation processes, thereby stressing the difference between 
government and governance. This differentiation mainly results from the 
acknowledgement of the role of private actors (Richards and Smith 2002; 
Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). Private actors may  
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independently [be] engaged in self-regulation, or a regulatory task may 
have been delegated to them by a public authority, or they may be 
regulated jointly with a public actor. This interaction may occur across 
levels (vertically) or across arenas (horizontally) (Heritier 2002: 3). 
These characteristics make MLG suitable for analysing both climate 
policy and renewable-energy policy (Chen and Fischer 2011). In the con-
text of climate-change issues, global governance and MLG help us to 
conceptualise 1) the processes of climate-change negotiations at the 
global level, 2) the role of institutions such as the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, and 3) the impact of civil society initiatives 
(Schreurs 2010). In the context of renewable-energy policies, the applica-
tion of the MLG approach results from the acknowledgement of the 
importance of regulation and standards, the significance of coordination 
among different actors, and the importance of local initiatives (Smith 
2006). 
While the MLG literature traditionally focused on Western Europe-
an countries, we argue that it is also a useful analytical tool to analyse and 
understand policy developments in China. The MLG approach, of 
course, is also a useful analytical tool to analyse Sino-European relations 
at the international level. However, we argue that it is necessary to un-
derstand the multi-level governance processes within China and the EU 
before one can analyse China–EU relations on the international level.  
As China is a very large country in terms of both territory and popu-
lation, top-down, autocratic and one-size-fits-all approaches are often 
not suitable or even feasible. During the early socialist period (before 
1978), this problem was mirrored in discussions regarding the complex 
processes of coordination, implementation and supervision among dif-
ferent ministries at the national, provincial and sub-provincial levels as 
well as via regional constituencies (Lyons 1987). Producing units were 
said to face the challenge of serving “multiple step-mothers”, meaning 
that they received different instructions from line ministries’ local offices 
responsible to the central government, on one side, and from local plan-
ning institutions on the other. Coordination, communication, planning 
and supervision worked somehow within the vertical and regional sys-
tems but not between them, thus creating coordination failure and ineffi-
ciency (Fischer 2000).  
Today, at first glance, policy implementation in China is clearly a 
top-down process with the central government defining the policy 
frameworks through national plans, programmes, and legislation (see 
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Figure 3), which are then translated into plans, programmes and rules at 
the provincial and local levels. However, this process allows for policy 
variation at the local level, and the strictness of implementation is not 
uniform. In fact, governance failure in China is often attributed to weak 
implementation or to actors at the local level outright ignoring policies 
developed at higher administrative levels. 
Figure 3: Policy Formulation in China across Government Levels 
Source: Fischer 2009. 
Different from policy implementation, policy development and policy 
formulation follow a process that is less top-down. In the course of eco-
nomic reforms, the coordination problem mentioned above was partly 
aggravated by the deliberate decentralisation of policy-making and im-
plementation that took place during the 1980s and early 1990s. During 
this early period of reform, provinces gained considerable economic de-
cision-making autonomy, and fiscal income generation capacities also 
shifted toward the provinces (Wong 2000). As a result, central govern-
ment decision-making today goes hand in hand with a myriad of preced-
ing consultations and lobbying involving actors from lower levels of 
government as well as the business sector (Kennedy 2008; Huang 2006). 
In fact, at least in recent decades, the Chinese practice of policy-making 
has developed processes to actively incorporate the interests and creativi-
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ty of different regions and actors. The integration of differing interests 
and experiences has become crucial in the way learning and consultation 
is organised before and during policy formulation and in the way policies 
are tested through “experimentation under hierarchy” and finally imple-
mented at the local level (see Figure 4) (Heilmann 2008; Fischer 2000). 
The analytical power of this approach is demonstrated in the study of 
local energy efficiency policy implementation in China. Progress resulted 
from bridging the gap between national priorities and local interests 
(Kostka and Hobbs 2012).  
In fact, learning and consultation, experimentation and implementa-
tion can be seen as the major elements of a Chinese policy-making cycle 
(Rodrik 2008). Wang (2009) argues that China’s politicians have been 
eager to learn from “bottom-up” experiences (practices) – local or 
“grass-roots” developments that emerged without explicit input from 
higher governance levels – as well as from the experiences of other 
countries. In this context, he stresses the growing role of policy advo-
cates (government agencies, local governments, international organisa-
tions, and domestic as well as foreign academic institutions) in the learn-
ing processes, and addresses the importance of the development of ex-
periments and – consequently – policy processes.  
This general conceptualisation of policy-making and implementation 
in China is also applicable to the Chinese wind and solar PV sector and 
the burden-sharing system of emission reductions. First of all, the tech-
nical and geophysical conditions for energy production from renewable 
energies differ considerably from one region to the other as does their 
endowment with traditional fossil fuel resources; hence, provinces have 
different interests with regard to the promotion of their specific indus-
tries and are facing different cost–benefit ratios in terms of emissions 
reductions. It is, therefore, essential to come from a multi-level under-
standing of policy-making and implementation in China to grasp these 
differences between provinces. Furthermore, in the case of wind and 
solar PV energy industries it is necessary to systematically trace the pub-
lic–private nexus as there is a clear relationship between political support 
and the success of national renewable-energy industries (Lewis and Wiser 
2007). This general observation is even more relevant in the case of Chi-
na, where considerable shares of producers of wind and solar PV tech-
nologies – and operators – are state-owned.  
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Figure 4: Policy Learning Process in China 
Source: Authors’ own conceptualization. 
Global Value-Chain Approach 
The GVC approach builds on Porter’s (1985) attempt to understand 
competitive advantages of companies. From a business management 
perspective, he argued for disaggregating corporate structures into dif-
ferent activities like design, production, marketing and distribution – the 
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value chain – in order to understand their cost structure and competitive 
advantages. The GVC approach goes beyond Porter in three important 
respects: First, it is centrally concerned with value chains in which activi-
ties are divided between different firms. Second, it deals explicitly with 
relationships between firms in different countries, hence the term “global 
value chain”. The approach seeks to analyse how firms in different coun-
tries occupy different positions in the chain, thereby creating an interna-
tional division of labour. Third, the approach does not merely map the 
chains, but also seeks to understand the uneven relationships between 
firms in the chain and is particularly concerned with the role of the lead 
firms in governing the chain (Gereffi 1999). 
The GVC approach thus emphasises that the relationship between 
firms within and between countries can be organised in different ways, 
with different types and degrees of outsourcing and chain coordination. 
These relations often extend far beyond pure market transactions (Mess-
ner 2002). Accordingly, GVC research does not aim to merely describe 
which products or services are produced where and by whom – instead, 
the focus lies on governance structures: “A chain without governance 
would just be a string of market relations” (Humphrey and Schmitz 
2002: 4).  
Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon (2005) identified a range of value-
chain governance forms. Two of these are well described in economics 
and business studies. First, value-chain coordination can be left entirely 
to the market. Buyers and suppliers do not have a close relationship with 
one another, and switching costs are low for both buyers and suppliers. 
Coordination is largely a result of prices in spot markets. Second, chain 
coordination can be internalised in firm hierarchies. This is the case of 
value chains that span headquarters and subsidiaries of multinational 
corporations (MNCs). Such MNCs are becoming increasingly important 
in renewable-energy industries as markets become global. 
Much GVC research has focused on two governance forms in the 
grey area between markets and hierarchies (see Figure 5). In modular 
value chains, suppliers produce in accordance to a buyer’s product speci-
fications but take full responsibility for the production process. Typically, 
this type of governance arises in industries where the information regard-
ing product specifications is easy to codify and can be exchanged with 
little explicit coordination. As we discuss later on in the paper, such 
modes have been observed in China in both the solar and wind power 
industries. Relational value chains are characterised by complex relation-
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ships between buyers and highly competent suppliers. In the case of this 
type of value chain, it is difficult to codify product specifications, trans-
actions are complex, and the required capabilities of suppliers are high. 
The costs of switching to other partners are high because of sunk costs 
arising from prior investment in relationships. This type of governance 
has tended to underpin commercial relations between assemblers and 
component suppliers in the European wind industry.  
Figure 5: Types of Governance in Global Value Chains  
Source: Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005. 
Understanding chain governance is important because lead firms define 
the barriers of entry for other companies into different segments of the 
value chain and consequently determine the returns that actors are able 
to draw from particular activities. In this way, the main analytical focus 
of GVC research is on the role of lead firms as drivers of economic ac-
tivities in a particular industry. The governance structures of various 
industry value chains have been analysed in different sectors as diverse as 
apparel, automotive, electronics, furniture and software (Gereffi 1999; 
Lema, Quadros, and Schmitz 2012; Navas-Alemán 2011; Sturgeon 2002; 
Sturgeon, Van Biesebroeck, and Gereffi 2008), where lead firms are in 
most cases large retailers, assemblers and brand-name companies. These 
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studies have shown that global leading firms often have the leverage to 
structure their relationships with upstream and downstream corporate 
actors in order to sustain their position in relation to current and new 
competitors. They also show that competitiveness often depends on 
supply base characteristics of individual value chains. It is no longer just 
lead firms that operate globally. In many industries, multinational suppli-
ers are capable of supporting lead firms in distinct markets across the 
globe (Sturgeon, Humphrey, and Gereffi 2011). Lead firms may have 
shared supply bases for particular components or services, while for 
others they may have separate supply bases. 
Such chain characteristics are critical determinants of the relative 
competitiveness of different lead firms. The literature has shown that 
distinct national models of chain organisation have emerged and that 
these models influence key sources of competitive advantage (Sturgeon 
2002). For example, Fujita (2010) argued that a Chinese value-chain 
model gained advantages over its Japanese counterparts in the motorbike 
industry. By using licences for outdated motorbike designs, Chinese 
assemblers were able to make motorbikes comprised largely of standard-
ised components. The use of such standard components increased price 
competition in the supply base and this gave them cost advantages that 
enabled them to take substantial market shares from the Japanese in 
Southeast Asian markets. A very similar model of competitiveness can be 
observed in the wind turbine industry (Lema et al. 2011). 
One of the distinctive features of the value-chain approach is its fo-
cus on how chains evolve over time and what the consequences are. 
While such changes have multiple sources, two factors have received 
particular attention: First, the chains are shaped by the location of lead-
ing markets (Kaplinsky, Terheggen, and Tijaja 2010). Many sectors have 
experienced declining demand from OECD countries and increasing 
demand from large emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil. 
This alters the role and nature of product and process standards and it 
changes (negatively) the upgrading prospects for many suppliers that 
compete with firms in the rapidly growing emerging economy supply 
bases (Kaplinsky, Terheggen, and Tijaja 2010). Such trends can be ob-
served in a range of green technology industries in which the markets 
have shifted to China. Second, suppliers in individual chains may acquire 
new capabilities and address new markets or market segments. This 
changes the power relations in the chains as new lead firms emerge 
among them (Schmitz 2007). This is what happened in the Chinese solar 
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industry, where component suppliers upgraded to assemble entire PV 
panels for export markets such as Germany. 
To sum up, the GVC concept offers a useful analytical framework 
that emphasises the importance of various forms of private governance 
in global industries. Yet, most of the available studies on the Chinese and 
global wind and solar PV sectors build implicitly on Porter’s concept, 
analysing “production” value chains in these sectors (e.g. Kirkegaard, 
Hanemann, and Weischer 2009; Kirkegaard et al. 2010). These studies 
map the different stages of the value-adding process: the upstream seg-
ment of the value chain (for example, provision of key material inputs), 
the actual production of the wind turbines and solar panels, and the 
downstream segment (for instance, marketing, deployment, mainten-
ance). These studies show what is produced, who produces it, and how 
much value addition is linked to each of the different segments. How-
ever, the studies lack a focus on governance structures. Understanding 
these governance structures is essential to being able to comprehend the 
sources of relative competitive advantages and the possible opportunities 
for cooperation between different value-chain actors. In fact, the GVC 
approach suggests that international competition in one part of the chain 
can coexist with cooperation in other parts of the chain. This in turn is 
essential for our purposes because Chinese wind and solar PV producers 
seek to compete globally and are integrating into global value chains in 
which European companies have hitherto played the major roles. 
The Value Added by a Multidimensional  
Framework
We argued above that there are no easy answers to the question of how 
relations between China and the EU will proceed regarding climate and 
renewable-energy issues. Views range from predominantly conflictual 
relations to scenarios of a “triple-win”, in which relationships are benefi-
cial to the global climate, China, and the EU. We have argued that un-
derstanding the prospects for cooperation, competition or conflict re-
quires distinguishing between actors at different levels of governance in 
China and Europe and including public and corporate actors (lead firms 
and suppliers of specific technologies). We need to distil the multi-level 
governance systems on both the Chinese and European sides because 
different actors have different interests and time frames. It is also neces-
sary when making an analysis to take into account the possibility that 
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certain groups of Chinese and European actors might cooperate, or that 
conflicts within China or Europe might develop.  
Figure 6 shows an integrated governance perspective that brings to-
gether the key elements of the approaches discussed in the preceding 
section. The key is to view public and private governance in conjunction 
and to take into account the multiple geographical scales of governance, 
ranging from local to global governance. We are not claiming that this 
figure captures all actors, but it does include the most important actors.  
The MLG approach is a useful analytical tool, especially in the con-
text of the Chinese and European climate policy as it takes a multi-actor 
perspective and comprehends politics as a multi-level game. Chen and 
Fischer (2011) apply the MLG approach to show that the potential for 
conflict and cooperation varies between different levels. Starting with the 
global level, China and the EU hold antagonistic positions in the context 
of the UNFCCC when it comes to issues such as burden-sharing, histor-
ical responsibilities, or measurement, reporting and verification (MRV). 
In contrast, at the national and subnational level, actors face similar is-
sues and undergo similar learning curves in both the EU and China, 
providing greater potential for cooperation. Fischer and Chen suggest 
that this potential for cooperation and common policy learning at the 
national and subnational levels can have positive spill-over effects on the 
international climate negotiations.  
The MLG approach also helps us to understand the impact of deci-
sions in the fields of climate and renewable-energy policy taken by public 
actors on various levels on behalf of corporate actors. The case made by 
businesses for investing in renewable energies depends to a large extent 
on the demand created by government regulations and market entry 
conditions. Here a combination of the MLG and GVC approaches is 
useful due to the influence of public actors on the design of institutions 
– defined as the “rules of the game” (North 1990) in the form of formal 
laws and regulations and informal actions – that influence business rela-
tions and industrial location. On the other hand, the negotiations in the 
context of the UNFCCC cannot be isolated from corporate sector de-
velopments. The main example in this respect is the recurring calls for 
transfer of low-carbon technologies as a means to support mitigation 
efforts in developing countries. The prospects for cooperation in the 
international climate regime, therefore, depend on the willingness of 
private companies to transfer technology to developing countries.  
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Figure 6: Integrated Perspective on MLG and GVC in the Renewable Energy 
Sector 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
In this respect, Lema, Berger, Schmitz and Song (2011) show that the 
changing global market shares in wind turbine manufacturing are largely 
an effect of Chinese government policy. Within the Chinese market, 
tensions have increased since the creation of a “dual market structure” 
for wind power projects, in which the Chinese firms have tended to get 
preferential access to supplying large government-led projects. With the 
absence of mutually binding rules on public procurement within the 
WTO, such potential sources of conflict will linger. Governments there-
fore have a major role to play in securing mutually beneficial relation-
ships for the future.  
A weakness of the MLG approach is that it does not account for the 
governance structures within and among the business actors involved. 
The nature of the relationships within and among private actors is not 
considered in a purely MLG analysis. The GVC perspective helps to 
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overcome this deficiency: It takes into account the interests of private 
actors, these interests being dependent on their technological capacities 
and the industry segment in which the actors are operating. By opening 
the black box of the private sector, it becomes possible to grasp the po-
tential for cooperation, competition and conflict.  
This analytical potential has been utilised by Lema, Berger, Schmitz 
and Song (2011). On the one hand, the shift of market demand and pro-
duction capacity from Europe to China results in an increased competi-
tion among Chinese and European lead firms in the Chinese market. 
However, by dissecting the value-chain perspective, it is possible to show 
how changes within these firms may lead to new areas of increased co-
operation. Based on their analysis of GVCs, Lema, Berger, Schmitz and 
Song (2011) describe new areas of collaborative relationships that are 
emerging and increasing with the globalisation and maturity of the indus-
try. As competition among leading firms is increasing, new cooperative 
relationships are emerging. As shown by the authors, Chinese and Euro-
pean actors that occupy different positions in the value chain are increas-
ingly likely to join forces in future wind power projects. Hence, they 
identify cooperative competition as a likely scenario for the future rela-
tionship between the EU and China in this industry.  
The importance of linking the MLG perspective with the GVC per-
spective is additionally highlighted by developments in the Chinese PV 
energy sector as presented by Fischer (2012). As in the wind energy sec-
tor, China has emerged as the new leader (replacing the EU) in produc-
ing solar PV equipment. However, in contrast to the wind sector, in 
which Chinese manufacturers still predominantly produce for the Chi-
nese market, the Chinese PV sector has emerged on the basis of policy 
support for solar-energy deployment schemes outside China, mainly in 
Europe. The development of China’s PV sector originated from the 
production of PV cells and modules. By focusing on cells and modules, 
enterprises concentrated on the segments of the PV energy technology 
value chain where they had competitive advantages due to low labour 
costs, economies of scale, and the comparatively weak environmental 
standards applied to production processes in China. Government sup-
port for these activities was driven by local considerations and was simi-
lar to support given by local government to other export-oriented indus-
tries. Support schemes for the use and deployment of PV energy tech-
nology in China evolved only in the context of the global financial crisis 
when export-oriented producers of PV cells and modules faced serious 
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risks. However, evolving support schemes at the national level left con-
siderable leeway for local governments to decide on additional support. 
As Li and Wang (2011) show, these local support schemes vary consid-
erably depending on the characteristics of the local PV sector develop-
ment and characteristics as well as the potential of PV energy use in dif-
ferent geographic regions.  
Overall, the development of the Chinese PV sector has been facili-
tated by the geographic mobility of solar panel production and the modu- 
larisation of the value chain. Hence, when the central government started 
to support PV energy use in China in 2009, the Chinese PV industry was 
already a fierce competitor in global markets. While European companies 
need to cooperate with Chinese partners in order to develop price com-
petitiveness and gain access to the potentially large but fragmented Chi-
nese market, cooperation with European partners can be interesting for 
Chinese enterprises where the latter can seek access to specific know-
ledge or pursue potential allies in their fierce struggle with competitors 
from within China. 
Conclusion 
China and the European Union are key actors in the global attempt to 
mitigate climate change. Both rank among the major emitters of green-
house gases, but more importantly, both are also key actors in the provi-
sion of renewable-energy technologies such as solar PV panels and wind 
turbines, and both are investing in the development of biomass technol-
ogy.  
Due to the commercial interests on both sides, climate-change miti-
gation is being viewed by Chinese and European governments as a mat-
ter of industrial policy – not (just) environmental policy. This is why 
conflictive rather than cooperative relations are often thought to domi-
nate. Although there is no shortage of contentious issues in Sino-EU 
relations in this respect, our research highlights the need to go beyond 
“headline rhetoric” to find sound ways of assessing the potential for 
future cooperation leading to mutual benefits. 
For this purpose, our article provides a multidimensional framework 
for analysing the prospects for cooperation, competition and conflict 
between China and EU. Our main argument is that the notion of conflict 
more often than not arises from a simplistic understanding of policies 
and industry actors. We argue that a multidimensional framework is ne-
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cessary because climate and renewable-energy relations between China 
and the EU take place on different levels involving various private and 
public actors. Furthermore, we argue that a more differentiated look on 
governance, industry development and innovation dynamics increases 
the potential for cooperation, for policy learning, and for a more positive 
assessment of competition.  
By investigating the contents of the black box of Sino-European 
climate and renewable-energy relations, it is possible to address both 
conflictive and cooperative patterns. We show that the perception of 
cooperative versus conflictive relationships differs among the actors 
involved. However, the main differences in actor perceptions are not 
between China and the EU but between positions in the value chain and 
in the governance systems on both sides. 
We provide an analytical framework that takes the complexities of 
climate and renewable-energy policy-making in both China and the EU 
into account. The MLG approach was developed to analyse intra-EU 
policy-making and has been applied in the analysis of global climate ne-
gotiations. We argue that China should also be regarded as an MLG 
system comparable to the EU when it comes to the interdependencies of 
policy development, formulation and implementation across different 
levels of governance.  
Furthermore, we suggest combining the MLG and the GVC ap-
proaches to analyse governance processes in the renewable-energy sec-
tors in China and the EU. While the MLG accounts for interactions of 
public and private actors, it insufficiently deals with the complexities of 
governance processes within and among firms. Here, the GVC approach 
is a useful analytical tool as it highlights inter- and intra-firm governance 
beyond the scope of mere market relations.  
Cutting through the complexities is essential in order to understand 
the rapidly changing world. Currently, we observe that competition be-
tween the lead firms of the wind and solar PV industries is increasing 
rapidly, not least as a result of China’s increasing production and innova-
tion power. From a global public goods perspective, this development 
should be welcomed as it drives down the price of renewable-energy 
technology, supporting the reduction of greenhouse gases. Policy-makers 
in China and Europe, of course, are concerned about not only the global 
gains, but also the distribution of gains among nations.   
In a rapidly globalising renewable-energy sector, however, it be-
comes ever more difficult to define the “national content” of a wind 
 China–Europe Relations in the Mitigation of Climate Change 93 
turbine or a solar PV panel. Production and innovation in both sectors 
are increasingly globalised. To mention some examples: The Chinese 
system of renewable-energy production is entering a new stage where it 
is increasingly important to improve the quality and reliability of tech-
nology. Hence, Chinese lead firms should seek to collaborate with Euro-
pean companies at various stages of the value chain to develop this ex-
pertise. To continue the transition to low-carbon energy production, 
Europe, in its current stage of prolonged economic crisis, is in need of 
affordable renewable-energy technology. European lead firms, under 
pressure to reduce costs, should seek to cooperate with Chinese firms 
and learn from their business and financing models.  
Of course, these examples of enhanced cooperation should not sug-
gest that the future will definitely bring about gains for all actors at the 
various levels of governance. Competition, understood as creative de-
struction (Schumpeter 1962), inevitably also produces losers. At first 
sight, the current downturn in the European solar PV industry may serve 
as an example. However, looking at these developments through our 
multidimensional analytical lens, we find that the story is more complex 
and less alarming that many view it. While it is true that European lead 
firms of the production value chain are losing market shares due to in-
creased competition from Chinese lead firms, European operation and 
maintenance companies in the downstream segment of the value chain 
are likely to benefit from the expansion of the market as a result of fall-
ing prices for solar PV equipment.  
The important message for policy-makers interested in mitigating 
climate change and promoting renewable-energy industries – and for 
researchers giving policy advice – is, therefore, not to follow simplistic 
narratives but to rely on multidimensional analyses of the renewable-
energy industries worldwide.  
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